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The	EMU	quest	for	integration:	What	does	the	ECB’s
collateral	data	tell	us?
The	ECB	recently	announced	that	its	quantitative	easing	programme	will	stop	at	the	end	of
2018.	Corrado	Macchiarelli	and	Mara	Monti	write	that	the	way	this	decision	is	managed
will	be	crucial	for	avoiding	potential	market	disruptions	in	the	eurozone.	However,	the	key
long-term	concern	will	be	achieving	political	consensus	in	the	coming	years	given	the
challenge	posed	by	the	rise	of	populist	parties	and	declining	support	for	the	EU’s
institutions.
Quantitative	easing	(QE)	has	been	the	monetary	policy	innovation	tool	of	the	21st	century.	With	the	global	economic
recovery	now	seemingly	robust,	the	challenge	facing	policymakers	is	how	to	reverse	this	exceptional	monetary	policy
stimulus.	The	Fed	has	already	started,	whereas	the	ECB	recently	announced	that	its	quantitative	easing	programme
will	stop	at	the	end	of	2018	given	the	eurozone’s	recovery	in	growth	and	inflation	is	expected	to	continue.	The	way
this	decision	is	managed	will	be	crucial	for	avoiding	potential	market	disruptions	in	the	eurozone	and,	in	particular,	in
the	periphery	via	a	widening	of	spreads.
Since	the	collapse	of	Lehman	Brothers,	central	banks	have	bought	14.2	trillion	dollars	of	financial	assets	overall,
mostly	sovereign	bonds.	This	has	been	the	biggest	and	fastest	accumulation	of	assets	since	the	beginning	of	the
financial	crisis,	but	now	that	a	post-QE	era	has	started,	greater	uncertainty	is	mounting.	Generally	speaking,	the	end
of	QE	constitutes	a	tightening	of	financial	conditions.	In	a	recent	note	to	the	European	Parliament,	we	underlined	the
crucial	role	played	by	the	ECB’s	collateral	policy	in	the	financial	system	as	a	mean	of	increasing	the	flow	of	money
from	where	it	is	currently	being	held	to	where	it	is	most	needed.	In	this	way,	the	collateral	acts	like	a	lubrication	for
the	financial	system.
The	ECB’s	collateral	frameworks	played	an	important	role	in	defining	what	was	considered	a	safe	asset	before	the
crisis.	The	2008	financial	crisis	and	the	adoption	by	the	ECB	of	non-standard	measures	led	to	a	revision	of	the
collateral	framework,	with	a	widening	of	the	balance	sheet	of	the	Eurosystem,	reflecting	the	growing	amount	of
assets	accepted	as	collateral.	At	the	same	time,	some	haircuts	were	increased	to	ensure	the	ECB	against	the	greater
liquidity	risk	and	greater	price	volatility	of	these	newly	admitted	debt	securities,	suggesting	that	the	riskiness	of	the
collateral	underlying	the	ECB’s	liquidity	operations	did	not	necessarily	increase	much	during	those	phases.
Not	only	had	the	ECB	taken	into	account	preempting	measures	in	line	with	changes	in	the	risks	underlying	the
refinancing	operations,	but	it	had	also	increased	its	exposure	against	potentially	larger	benefits	(i.e.	liquidity
considerations).	As	discussed	in	the	note,	the	arguments	for	protecting	the	ECB	against	losses	via	higher	average
haircuts,	particularly	during	acute	phases	of	the	business	cycle,	clearly	exist.	It	is	important,	however,	that	borrowing
from	the	central	bank	is	not	done	on	highly	unattractive	terms,	or	in	a	way	in	which	haircuts	become	evidently	pro-
cyclical.
The	importance	of	collateral	as	an	instrument	for	monetary	policy	has	increased	in	recent	years	not	only	in	the	light
of	the	aforementioned	changes	in	the	collateral	framework	to	cope	with	financially	distressed	sovereigns	and	banks
post-2010,	but	also	due	to	the	progressive	replacement	of	the	unsecured	money	market	segment	with	the	secured
one:	based	on	the	Euro	Area	Money	Market	Survey	2015	(the	last	year	for	which	the	survey	is	available),	the
proportion	of	the	secured	market	segments	over	the	total	money	market	transactions	moved	from	50%	in	2003,	to
90%	in	2015.	Both	aspects	are	set	to	have	consequences	for	collateral	availability	and	the	scarcity	of	high-quality
assets,	particularly	as	these	interact	with	non-standard	monetary	policy,	such	as	the	ECB’s	Expanded	Asset
Purchase	Programme	(EAPP).
In	the	note,	we	looked	for	evidence	in	the	ECB’s	EAPP	effects	through	the	quantity	of	collateral,	i.e.	the	number	of
eligible	assets	by	type	and	issuers,	and	its	quality,	as	captured	by	the	distribution	of	the	haircuts	across	asset	types
and	issuers,	based	on	the	detailed	Eurosystem	Collateral	Data.	On	the	public	purchase	side,	in	particular,	we	find
sovereign	bonds’	haircuts	have	not	returned	to	what	was	observed	back	in	2010.	The	distribution	has	shifted	slightly
overall	mainly	due	to	some	large	haircuts	related	to	particular	issuers.	There	could	be	signs	of	a	restrictive	revision	of
the	haircut	policy	preempting	a	‘normalisation’	phase	of	monetary	policy.
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As	a	result	of	the	EAPP,	the	spreads	of	all	asset	classes	have	shrunk	except	for	bank	bonds	as	they	are	excluded
from	the	ECB	purchase	programme	(as	shown	in	Table	1).	The	haircut	distribution	on	these	asset	classes	has
continued	to	shift	considerably	as	a	whole	after	2014,	suggesting	further	increases	in	the	average	haircut	for	this
whole	asset	class,	and	possibly	signalling	market	fragmentation.
Table	1:	Introduction	of	different	measures	as	part	of	the	Expanded	Asset	Purchase	Programme
Note:	The	Eurosystem	started	to	buy	corporate	sector	bonds	under	the	corporate	sector	purchase	programme	(CSPP)	on	8	June
2016.	On	9	March	2015,	the	Eurosystem	started	to	buy	public	sector	securities	under	the	public	sector	purchase	programme
(PSPP).	The	asset-backed	securities	purchase	programme	(ABSPP)	started	on	21	November	2014.	On	10	May	2010,	the	central
banks	of	the	Eurosystem	started	purchasing	securities	in	the	context	of	the	Securities	Markets	Programme	(SMP).	Following	a
Governing	Council	decision	on	6	September	2012	to	initiate	outright	monetary	transactions,	the	SMP	was	terminated.	It	is
assumed	in	the	Table	the	OMTs	announcement	is	long-lived,	owing	to	the	permanent	availability	of	the	ECB	to	use	it	if	warranted.
On	2	July	2009,	the	Eurosystem	launched	its	first	covered	bond	purchase	programme	(CBPP1).	The	programme	ended,	as
planned,	on	30	June	2010	when	it	reached	the	announced	nominal	amount	of	€60	billion.	In	November	2011,	the	Eurosystem
launched	a	second	covered	bond	purchase	programme	(CBPP2).	The	programme	ended,	as	planned,	on	31	October	2012	when	it
reached	a	nominal	amount	of	€16.4	billion.	Source:	Based	on	the	ECB’s	explanation	of	its	Expanded	Asset	Purchase	Programme
Now	that	the	European	Central	Bank	has	communicated	its	plans	to	wind	up	the	bond-buying	programme	at	the	end
of	this	year,	the	question	remains	of	whether	and	how	financial	markets	will	cope	with	the	lack	of	excess	demand
coming	from	the	ECB’s	EAPP.	This	might	release	some	government	debt	but	risk	creating	a	dual	market	for	collateral
between	core	and	periphery.	In	this	respect,	the	possibility	for	the	ECB	to	extend	monetary	policy	beyond	the
conventional	if	warranted,	as	announced	by	the	ECB	President	recently,	will	be	crucial,	at	least	in	the	short	term.
In	the	medium	and	long-term,	however,	the	completion	of	a	Banking	and	Capital	Market	Union	will	be	of	paramount
importance	to	avoid	future	high	haircuts	or	the	scarcity	of	safe	assets	affecting	the	ability	of	banks	in	the	periphery	to
shift	to	secured	funding.	With	the	new	populist	governments	in	Europe,	in	particular	in	Italy	and	Austria,	and	cold
sentiments	towards	European	institutions	being	on	the	rise	in	some	countries,	achieving	a	political	consensus
towards	greater	solidarity	will	represent	the	biggest	challenge	for	Europe	as	it	aims	to	safeguard	its	very	nature	and
deliver	on	economic	and	financial	stability	in	the	future.
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